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SCIENCE COLUMN: 
RECONSTRUCTION: THE EXPERIMENTAL 
SIDE OF DIGITAL FORENSICS 
Fred Cohen  
California Sciences Institute 
California, USA 
ABSTRACT 
Many in digital forensics seem to forget that the science part of digital 
forensics means experimentation and that implies a whole lot of things that 
most practitioners never learned. 
MOST CASES 
Most cases don't seem to involve anything in the way of experimentation or 
science. They involve bag and tag, transport, search, and present. Looking for 
contraband content? No problem. If you know what you are looking for and it 
is found, it is present. The reason it is seemingly so simple is that there is a 
whole lot of research and development surrounding the searching process that 
has been done for the last 50+ years. And if found, it's usually pretty easy to 
verify that what was found was what you were looking for. Find a file, 
compare the cryptographic checksum to a known item for a presumptive 
positive, compare bit-for-bit to the original for a definitive answer, selectively 
look at them with another tool just to make sure, and tell the court: “[This] is 
what I did, [this] is what I saw.” But maybe that's just most of your cases... it's 
almost none of mine. 
MY CASES 
Maybe I am unusual. I don't really know. I don't tend to take on cases where 
there are 2 hours allowed for an answer. I tend to take on cases where there is a 
period of months over which different issues come up. I tend to be in cases 
where so-called experts say or write things that don't, to me, appear on their 
face to be strictly true. And I tend to be in cases where I have to make sure 
before I make a declaration. These cases almost always involve some 
experimentation. Or as I call it–reconstruction. 
Suppose someone claims that some e-mail was sent from some place because 
an email header says so. My first reaction is to ask why they come to that 
conclusion. What is the basis? And in most of the cases I have encountered, 
they haven't told me the basis for their opinions in their reports. So I check it 
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out. Suppose they mistakenly say something like “all [X] are [Y]”. That's 
almost never true, so I check it out. And so should you. 
CHECK IT OUT 
“When in doubt, check it out.” If it isn’t already an official saying for digital 
forensics, it should become one. Cite me on it. The lawyers prefer this, I think. 
They seem to me to really want to know the truth. If it goes against them, they 
want to know that so they can prepare for the contingency. And if it goes for 
them, they want to know because it helps their case. In either case, it really 
hurts if they think one thing and later find out something else. 
To check it out, the first thing I usually do is try to repeat whatever the other 
side did. It's not that I don't believe them. I just think it's your job to check out 
the claims of the folks on the other side of the isle. If they say that Google 
searches don't come up with the same result much of the time, even though my 
experience agrees with them, I will still check it out. I just did. I did the 
following search: 
site:all.net supercalifragilisticexpialidocious 
It came back with: 
Your search–site:all.net supercalifragilisticexpialidocious - did 
not match any documents. 
Suppose you repeat it. See if your result differs. If not, we have just refuted by 
experiment something that we may well have thought was true. I know, if you 
do it in another language, it might come out differently, but if it means the 
same thing then the result is equivalent (the meaningful part–none found–if 
that is the thing we are trying to understand). 
You think this is cheating? Because it's only true for searches returning no 
results? Try looking for something else at all.net and see what happens. Try 
disabling the advertising or ignoring it if it's not the relevant part of the issue. 
So maybe I need to update my saying... “Always doubt, check it out.” 
MOST EXPERIMENTS ARE PRETTY SIMPLE 
I like to think that most of the most meaningful experiments in digital forensics 
are really simple enough for the jury or judge to do on their own. If not, they 
take a lot more explaining. I don't mind all that explaining, but I think it works 
better when there is less of it and the judge and jury say to themselves “I get it” 
as opposed to “Huh?” 
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CAUSALITY AND REFUTATION BASICS 
I have said and will likely say this often and again. Effect does not imply 
cause. Rather cause (C) acting through mechanisms (m) produces effects (E), 
expressed as C→mE. To have a scientific hypothesis, it is not enough to state 
that C produces E, it is also necessary to identify the mechanism by which C 
produces E. Testing can then be repeatedly done to confirm or refute the 
hypothesis of C→mE by trying to refute the hypothesis. If refutation fails, it is a 
confirmation, while if refutation succeeds, they hypothesis as stated cannot be 
correct. 
If that sounds like exactly what I said last time, it is. It continued: 
While many confirmations may be found, any number of confirmations of a 
universal statement do not prove it to be correct, while a single refutation 
demonstrates its falsehood1. Typically, science progresses when a refutation is 
identified, the errors in the C→mE hypothesis are identified, and an updated 
C'→m'E version of the hypothesis is created to mitigate the refutation cases, or 
the hypothesis abandoned. 
When faced with a statement that is not couched in the proper specifics, always 
try to refute it by experiment. Predict a cause and effect per the proposed claim. 
Create a cause that meets the specifics of the claim, observe the effect, and see 
if the prediction fails to match the expectation. Try edge cases, like my “no 
result” search. Try center cases. Try the exact thing the other side tried, but 
with unspecified conditions set in other ways. Try things! And report them all. 
Don't just say I found this refutation. Say that you tried some cases that worked 
out as predicted (if you find them). 
To serve your client in a system based on an adversarial approach, you might 
end up not testing exhaustively. The client may not support it because it has a 
real financial cost. And you are not obligated to try to prove the case for the 
other side. But on the other hand, sometimes you end up exhausting the space 
and never coming up with a confirmation. But hopefully, when you are making 
such statements, that won't happen... because... 
TEST YOURSELF BEFORE YOU EXPRESS OPINIONS 
Even when you know you are right, you should still perform tests to try to 
refute your own claims. You could take the position that it has to be done 
because I might end up on the other side and you don't want to look bad when I 
come up with a counterexample. But a better reason is because it's the right 
thing to do in a scientific field. But I admit that's not why I do it. I do it because 
                                                          
1 K. Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Hutchins and Company, 
London. ISBN10: 0415278449. 
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it's not enough to believe I am right, I need to prove it to myself experimentally 
before I am willing to tell it to the judge and jury. 
One of the areas I most often encounter in this regard is metadata. Before going 
into more detail, I should point out that metadata as used in the computing field 
differs from metadata as used in the archives and records management space. 
Notably, this difference is not always made clear to the legal community which 
is used to metadata associated with archives and public record-keeping systems 
as the information that makes definitive the chain of custody and provenance 
of such records, rending them accurate and reliable. This is not the case with 
regard to metadata as it is used in the computing fields, where, for example, the 
date and time stamp on a file can be readily changed by the user. 
Regardless of its ready changeability in computer systems, the sort of metadata 
associated with file and directory date and time stamps and ownership is 
produced by automated mechanisms that are specific to particular operating 
environments. Because they differ depending on a wide range of different 
factors, claiming meaningful information about metadata without adequate 
experimental basis is likely to be problematic if challenged. And it often yields 
results that are not accurate, are less precise then claimed, and end up asserting 
events in an order different from the reality of what took place. 
In order to be more certain about such results, or in order to test the claims of 
others, reconstruction is really the only available method. While the literature 
on how date and time stamps are produced may indicate one thing or another, 
there have been various experiments performed and results published that 
indicate different results for the apparently same tests. These differences may 
be due to patch variations or other environmental conditions, and thus testing 
in situ is the optimal approach for getting the right answer. 
PRECISION, ACCURACY, AND RELIABILITY 
Precision has to do with the number of digits provided. For example, a time 
stamp may indicate results to the nearest second, microsecond, millisecond, or 
some other time span. But just because the indication is to this many digits of 
precision doesn't mean the measurement itself is. A timestamp, in some cases, 
is only recorded based on the date, ignoring the time. But the record may be in 
a format including fields ranging to the millisecond. Or the routine that reads 
the record may return results with fields that don't exist in the original data, set 
to pre-defined default values. In examination and presentation, limiting the 
precision of reporting is important to providing the trier of fact with the real 
information presented without a false sense of precision. If the measurement is 
to the nearest second, adding the millisecond fields is misleading. In comparing 
two measurements recorded to different levels of precision, if they are too 
close to each other, you cannot reliably indicate an ordering and should 
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indicate that you cannot do so, presenting the ordering information so that the 
multiple possible orderings are readily apparent. 
Accuracy has a lot to do with whether the things being measured are properly 
calibrated. For example, even though a measurement may be precise to the 
nearest millisecond, it could be offset from another measurement by hours or 
days. Even with network time protocol (NTP) working properly, variances of 
milliseconds to seconds are not unusual. And it is not always working properly. 
Sometimes, even though it is running, it is not connecting with remote servers. 
And recent demonstrations show that NTP is attackable and forgeable, as is 
global positioning system (GPS) data. Cellular phones use data from the 
telephone network which can and often is offset by seconds from other time 
sources. While the problem of accuracy has long been known and many folks 
have tried to subvert forensics by changing system clocks, even without 
malice, you have to be careful to get it right and report it properly. 
Reliability is something entirely different. In the term of art of archives and 
records management, it is the correspondence of the records to reality. This is 
something that is very difficult in terms of the current state of the science. 
Tying a computer record to reality involves a lot of indirection (hopefully not 
misdirection). 
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE RESCUE 
Because of the nature of digital systems and the fact that effect doesn't imply 
cause, looking at an audit trail indicating a login of a user identity at a time 
from a terminal identifier is not adequate to tell us that someone logged in with 
that user identity from that terminal at that time. But we can drive causality 
forward by reconstructing the conditions on the system and doing tests of 
various theories of the case, demonstrating that the tests came out consistent 
with some set of theories of the case and inconsistent with another set of 
theories of the case. 
The question of what theories to test and to what level of certainty depends on 
the nature of the case and the standard of proof. For example, in a patent case 
for invalidity, an existence proof of prior art is all that is required. In such a 
case, a single reconstruction of a system existing prior to the relevant dates in 
the case that fulfills all of the elements of the patent may be perfectly adequate. 
But in another case, such as an attribution case where there are many 
possibilities of ways to bypass the normal authentication process, much more 
may be required. 
Attribution of computer-related acts in a criminal case where the defendant 
claims they didn't undertake the relevant acts is an example of a far more 
complex situation. It's hard to prove a negative (I didn't do it), but it is also 
non-trivial to prove a positive beyond a reasonable doubt. For attribution, 
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regardless of the issues outside of the computer, which must be addressed to 
establish presence of the individual at the time and place asserted as used for 
access, the acts of the individual as opposed to alternatives become a critical 
issue, if challenged. Did someone else have access? If they did, could they 
have yielded the same traces identified? Did the system actually work as 
asserted? Was there a Trojan horse or other mechanism in place that altered the 
normal operation? 
Given the assumption that recent revelations regarding government access 
programs for user and owner unauthorized access are true, this becomes more 
than a theoretical issue. Once we start to realize that the technology for covert 
unauthorized access has long been distributed and used on a large scale, the 
question of proof of activities becomes harder to show. How do we know that 
another actor did not commit the acts being denied by the suspect? If a Trojan 
is in place and well hidden, how can we find it? If we find one, is that the only 
one? If we are able to use it, can we produce the traces found? If we can 
produce those traces, how do we show that nobody else in fact undertook acts 
to produce the traces? The whole foundation of trust required to make 
assertions about traces reflecting reality and causality come into question. 
What we can do is reconstruct scenarios in which the actor did undertake the 
act and seek to differentiate the alternatives from each other by examination of 
increasingly details sets of traces. As we move through this process, if we find 
that none of the traces we can reproduce meaningfully demonstrate the act, we 
cannot assert the attribution of the act to the actor and in fact must both refute 
those acts and confirm that something else we do not understand took place. 
Any hypothetical that is consistent with the available traces is possible, 
including system subversion by unknown 3rd parties. 
If and to the extent we identify specific sets of event sequences consistent with 
theories of the case, with the traces found in a reconstruction, and with the 
traces found in the original writing, we can assert that the cause could have 
produced the effect to the extent the methods we used were able to 
differentiate, and through refutation, eliminate other possibilities while 
potentially leaving still other possibilities not yet confirmed or refuted. That is 
the limit of what we can do. 
PRECISION, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Reconstruction can rarely, if ever, produce exactly the same traces as the traces 
in the original writing. Because most digital systems are quite complex, even 
though many of their component parts are highly repeatable, timing, state 
information, external context, and other similar phenomena produce different 
traces for repetitions of the same experiment. It is impossible to perfectly 
reproduce an experiment and thus repetition of experiments are not always 
identical. The differences and similarities between experiments and their 
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results have to be understood in the context of the matter at hand in order to 
meaningfully reproduce events and understand results. This then comes down 
to understanding the base rates of differences, at a minimum, in terms of 
precision, accuracy, and reliability. 
For example, to reproduce a Web access sequence to test the logs generated, 
files altered, and technical metadata produced by the process, we might 
reasonably perform a set of experiments in nearly identical conditions to see 
what the variances are in results of the measured phenomena as reflected in 
traces. Then we might vary parameters, such as system loads, time of day, 
cache conditions, and so forth. But which we have to do might also depend on 
the need to be accurate for a particular case, and the number of repetitions 
depends on the statistical model in use and the related assumptions. Sampling 
theory has to be applied to generate the answers to such questions, but only if 
and to the extent that multiple samples are relevant to the issues at hand. 
If you don't know what these things are, chances are you aren't qualified to 
make decisions about whether and to what extent they are needed in order to 
get the right answers. While you may not usually have to worry because the 
experts and lawyers on the other side probably don't know what these things 
are either, you should still concern yourself with them, because otherwise, you 
could easily get the wrong answers. And isn't justice about getting at the truth 
and digital forensics a path toward that end? 
EDITORIAL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Building a science surrounding digital forensics requires a methodology for 
addressing experiments. The experimental branch of digital forensics is, in 
large part, what we call reconstruction. 
Reconstruction involves identifying and repeating event sequences that test 
theories of the case in order to refute or confirm different theories based on 
available evidence. This is done by comparing the traces produced in the 
original writing to reconstructions of event sequences under different theories 
of the case. 
In order to draw conclusions about the results of reconstruction, it is necessary 
to understand the issues of what constitutes a refutation and confirmation, 
precision, accuracy, and reliability issues, and the supporting fields such as 
relevant areas of statistics. 
Disagree? Let us know! It's the only way we can grow. 
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